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It is a privilege that I can speak to this audience on my most favourite 
subject that even after three decades of learning still keeps me buoyant. 
The inaugural lecture is a tradition to familiarize the audience with a 
newly appointed professor’s specialization in the discipline. So, I shall 
first illustrate in non-technical terms the content of Corporate Finance 
and the theme of this lecture. Afterwards, I shall present a synopsis of 
some of my past and current research.
I joined this young entrepreneurial research university last year. Its 
mission is to integrate social and engineering sciences; to develop 
High Tech with Human Touch. In this context, I have chosen the title 
of my lecture as the technology of corporate finance. If any one thinks 
that I shall be talking about new money machines or supercomputers 
that can provide quick answers of financing problems, then let me tell 
you at the outset that you will be disappointed. The thesis that I am 
going to put forward is that it is a myth to associate technology with 
machines only. True technological development comes from managing 
a set of combined scientific knowledge and resources – technical and 
non-technical. Corporate finance is a good example in this regard.
CoRPoRATE fINANCE
Let me start with explaining what corporate finance is all about. Here, 
I take resort to a few legendary textbooks. In the most simplistic 
form, one can say that it is about the financial decisions of firms, the 
range of activities in which finance managers are engaged in. Brealey, 
Myers and Allen (2008) assert two main types of financial decisions: 
(i) spending money i.e. what investments should a firm make; and (ii) 
5raising money, i.e. how should it pay for those investments? These two 
decisions are vital for any firm, be it small, medium or large enterprises, 
private or public corporations.
The authors of another popular textbook, Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe 
and Jordan (2008) stress that the most important job of a financial 
manager is to increase the value of the firm by making smart 
decisions. Value is created when the cash paid to firm’s investors 
(shareholders and debtholders) is greater than the cash raised in 
the financial markets. Figure 1 shows the cash flows that form the 
main activities of a finance manager. The focus is on value because 
cash flows take place over time and these require to be discounted 
to allow meaningful comparison in present value terms. Value also 
reflects the impact of other considerations like firm’s obligation 
to employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the society.
Figure 1: Cash flows managed bu the finance manager. Source: Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008)
6Survey evidence indicates that the tasks of finance managers have 
evolved immensely during the last two decades and these can vary 
across countries and firm size (see for example, Brounen, de Jong 
and Koedijk, 2004). Megginson, Smart and Graham (2010) sketch 
the practice of corporate finance as involving five basic functions:
(i) Financing function – raising capital for company’s operations and 
investments;
(ii) Financial management function – managing firm’s cash flows;
(iii) Capital budgeting function – selecting the best investment projects;
(iv) Risk management function – managing firm’s exposure to risk; and
(v) Corporate governance function – developing a suitable corporate 
governance structure.
This list shows that raising and investing capital is associated with a range 
of related activities that also form an integral part of corporate finance. 
Duffhues (2002) has also emphasized such a broad categorization so as 
to include all ‘financial decision making’ activities of firms. The finance 
manager of a firm must have adequate knowledge regarding the 
identification, measurement and management of different risk exposures 
(coming from changes in, for example, foreign exchange rates, interest 
rates or commodity prices). Finally, designing an appropriate corporate 
governance framework whereby interests of different stakeholders 
(owners, managers, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers) are 
duly taken into account is also a vital corporate finance function.
TEChNoLoGy
So far the introduction on corporate finance; now the other part of the title: 
technology. According to the popular on-line encyclopedia, Wikipedia, 
the term ‘technology’ is described as the usage and knowledge of tools, 
techniques, systems or methods of organization. The Oxford dictionary 
defines technology as the application of scientific knowledge for 
7practical purposes. The word originated in the 17th century from the 
Greek word ‘technologia’ – téchnē: an art, skill or craft; and – logía: the 
study of something, or the branch of knowledge of a discipline. Following 
this characterization, I shall use my inaugural address to demonstrate 
the richness of corporate finance in applying scientific knowledge from 
a long list of disciplines. I believe, this is what technology is all about.
Many people typically overlook this true meaning of technology, 
and become artificially more amazed with the exterior outfit. In 
everyday language, the term is used to refer to novel techniques 
and equipments. These are, of course, extremely important both in 
our personal, professional as well as social lives. But, technological 
improvement should not be linked with wearing white gowns 
only.1 Mastering knowledge to organize and manage different 
kinds of resources is the actual key to technological innovation. The 
appropriate use of aggregate knowledge an organization possesses 
also makes sure that bad things do not happen to a good technology.
ThE TEChNoLoGy of CoRPoRATE fINANCE
The technology one can encounter in the practice of corporate finance 
can be presented in Figure 2. As you can see, finance has intense links 
with many subjects. In my own work, I rely heavily on utilizing ideas 
from some of these disciplines. The relationship with several subjects 
is well-known and straightforward, while in many other cases, it is still 
evolving.2 Since a comprehensive discussion of each and every link will 
1 A report published in 2009 by the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts in the UK shows 
that investments made by private sector business on traditional scientific research and development expen- 
ditures represent only 11 per cent of the total investment in innovation. The rest includes a range of comple- 
mentary investments needed to commercialize ideas, including product design, training in new skills, organiza- 
tional innovation, developing new customer offering and brands, and copyright.
2 Many of these links have given rise to established terms like financial mathematics, financial engineering,  
financial architecture; not to speak of neuro finance, biological finance, forensic finance, nuclear finance.
 
8take a long time, I shall briefly focus on a few illustrations. Therefore, 
the following discussion is by no means meant to be complete.
Corporate finance manager needs information provided by accounting 
to estimate cash flows and value financial claims. Accounting 
professionals prepare financial statements based on certain principles 
and rules whereas finance professionals use accounting information 
to gain insights into the firm’s cash flows. The profit figures we all are 
interested in are meant to shed light on how a company is performing. 
But, traditional accounting based on historical cost (where assets 
and liabilities are carried at their original value) and accrual (where 
revenues and expenses are recorded when incurred) approaches leads 
Figure 2: The technology of corporate finance.
9to estimates that can not be taken in their face values to make sound 
decisions. Corporate finance practitioners thus need to understand 
the foundation of accounting information. Similarly, when companies 
want to raise new capital, these transactions need to be marketed 
properly to potential investors. In this respect, corporate finance 
professionals need to know marketing principles. Another subject is 
economics which is essential to understand corporate finance. Popular 
theories on agency – managers’ interests need not align with those of 
investors, asymmetric information – managers know more about their 
firm than others, and signalling – managers communicate information 
indirectly, have become standard tools to explain loads of corporate 
finance issues. Microeconomic matters like incentives and risk sharing, 
to macroeconomic issues such as oil price changes, financial crises 
and recession, all affect corporate financing and investments.
The influence of organization theory is also prominent in corporate 
finance. Here, the main advantage is that one can study organizational 
issues from multiple viewpoints: principal/agent theory, transaction 
cost theory, resource-based theory, institutional theory, and so on. 
Ideas borrowed from domains like strategy, entrepreneurship, and the 
phenomena like institutionalization, globalization help explain corporate 
finance issues, especially of small and medium sized enterprises and 
firms from emerging market economies. Studies have also shown that 
the pattern of corporate financing activities can be fully understood 
by an examination of social relations, for example, director interlocks 
(Mizruchi, Marquis and Stearns, 2006). The logic of sociological finance 
has been used by Zajac and Westphal (2004) to analyze the finding 
from a commonly used corporate finance technique (event study) 
to measure stock market reactions to corporate policies.3 Recently, 
another study (Prechel and Morris, 2010) shows that corporate as 
3  Zajac and Westphal (2004) show that the fact that stock market reacts more positively to share repurchase 
plans even though the rate of its implementation decreases can be explained by the institutional process in 
which investors base their decisions by referencing to prior market reactions.
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well as political structures enacted in the 1980s and 1990s gave 
opportunities to managers to engage in inflating firms’ balance sheets.
Insights from psychology to understand investor and managerial 
behaviour in the financial context have made behavioural finance an 
established body of research. More and more studies are showing the 
presence of several anomalies in finance, and many economists are 
discarding the idea that investors / managers always behave rationally 
and financial markets are efficient. Behavioural finance thus sheds 
light to areas that can not be explained using orthodox economic 
principles. Let me just use one recent study as an illustration. 
Kaplanski and Levi (2010) analyze 288 large-scale (with at least 75 
casualties) world-wide aviation disasters that occurred during 1950-
2007, and find that the average capital market loss is more than $60 
billion per accident whereas the estimated actual loss is no more 
than $1 billion. They observe that on the third day after the disaster, 
there is an increase in stock returns that is about half the magnitude 
of the first day’s decline. The stock price reversal continues and the 
stock market fully reverts back in about 10 days after the accident. 
The authors provide bad mood and anxiety coming from the media 
coverage as the explanation of the associated stock price changes. 
The way individual’s emotional states influence financial decision-
making process is the area of neuro-finance. Psychological concepts 
like overconfidence and herding seem to have a neural basis and 
are used in finance research. Tseng (2006) states that with the 
help of medical technology such as positron emission tomography 
and magnetic resonance imaging, researchers conduct controlled 
experiments to investigate brain activities involving financial decisions.4 
4 A recent study (Dickhaut et al., 2010) on neuro-accounting proposes that the way accounting principles have  
emerged has distinct parallels with the evolution of human brain in evaluating economic exchange.
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Law has especially been dominating the finance scene last few years, 
although a large number of studies have in the past examined the effect 
of diverse financial regulations. The topic received my interest while I 
was a PhD student. In a joint study with Theo Vermaelen, I examined the 
stock market liquidity effect of introducing insider trading restrictions 
(for details, see Kabir and Vermaelen, 1996). A few years ago, Peter-
Jan Engelen and I undertook a study to investigate the effect of trading 
suspension regulation on the disclosure of new information to the capital 
market (Engelen and Kabir, 2006). Throughout the last several years, 
substantial research emphasis has been on examining the relationship 
between a country’s legal origin (civil law and common law) and 
corporate financing issues as well as financial market development. 
Financial crisis always gives a boost towards new demand for increased 
regulation. The USA has been in the front position for many decades. 
Whenever something goes wrong, demands for regulatory reforms 
arise, and many other countries follow suit. Several new laws covering 
banking, investment and securities trading were introduced during 
the post-1930s era. In the late 1970s, the USA started a process of 
de-regulation of financial markets that accelerated in the 1980s and 
1990s, and culminated in 1999, with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933, introduced to segregate investment banking from 
commercial banking. Then when the dotcom bust appeared and Enron 
collapsed, the period of re-regulation started. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was introduced in 2002 in order to strengthen firm’s corporate 
governance measures. New rules were enacted to control the 
behaviour of listed companies, their auditors and lawyers. This year is 
full of discussions on the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act – a document of more than 2000 pages covering almost every 
aspects of finance. One thing we should remember is that financial 
crises have always taken place in spite of all regulations countries 
had. After the crises in Latin America, East Asia and Japan we have 
now seen that Western industrialized countries are not immune too. 
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Will current attempts to impose new regulations reduce the 
likelihood of further financial crises? Alas, the answer is no. The 
chairperson of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has 
recently acknowledged that the agency was not even aware of the 
accounting technique used by Lehman Brothers to hide some of 
the risks it took before its collapse in September 2008. Instead of 
changing behaviour solely by means of rules and regulations, which 
will always be faced with finding ways to circumvent these, a more 
effective and long-term approach, I believe, is to educate all financial 
market participants - bankers, traders, brokers, investors - about the 
pros and cons of financial decision makings, their impact on firms and 
the macro-economy, and also on prevailing ethics, norms and values.
Mathematics and Statistics are two areas with massive application 
on finance. Many people like mathematics because of its value 
in understanding corporate finance. In analyzing whether capital 
investments make sense, corporate finance principles require that we 
discount a series of long-term cash flows and find out if present value 
of benefits exceeds the costs. Mathematical methods are enormously 
helpful in this regard. A simple but elegant formula was developed in 
1958 by Myron Gordon (born on October 15, 1920 and died on July 
5, 2010): P = D / (k-g). The formula states that the price of a share 
(P) equals future dividend (D) divided by a factor (expected return k 
minus growth rate g). The formula is a straightforward mathematical 
exercise that allowed investors to estimate share price. There have 
been many more sophisticated applications of mathematics. Paul 
Samuelson (born on January 2, 1932 and died on December 13, 
2009) was instrumental in using mathematical insights in (financial) 
economics. The most renowned recognition came in 1997 when 
the Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Robert Merton and 
Myron Scholes because of their earlier work (with Fischer Black) 
on developing mathematical model on options theory that analyzes 
different claims shareholders and debtholders have on a firm.
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An important input in the option pricing formula is the estimate of 
how volatile the assets will be over the life of the option. Statistical 
methods are used in this regard. Statistics also provides the basic 
framework for finance, the mean-variance analysis which allows 
different investments to be compared in terms of the trade-off between 
expected return (measured by mean return) and risk (measured by 
the variance of returns). An investor who cares only about these 
two metrics will always prefer an investment that offers the highest 
mean return for any given amount of risk, or the lowest amount of 
risk for any given return. Many of us are analyzing financial data and 
examining empirical relationships among various variables. Obviously, 
we can not do this without statistics. The use of statistical tools to 
analyze finance issues was formally recognized by awarding in 2003 
the Nobel Prize for economics to Clive Granger and Robert Engle. 
‘Granger causality test’ to estimate which of several variables produce 
an effect on the others is routinely used by financial economists. The 
statistical technique developed by Engle (called ARCH: autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity) is widely used in assessing risk of 
financial portfolios. The technique throws away the assumption that 
the volatility of financial assets is constant; rather it changes over 
time in predictable ways, depending on its own behaviour in the past.
Although finance is a social science discipline, there is continuous 
interest on understanding how financial market behaviour in general 
or some extreme events can be analysed with the help of knowledge 
from Physics – the analysis of natural phenomena. Many of these like 
Brownian motion and uncertainty, oscillation and dynamical systems, 
etc. seem to have the potential in explaining financial phenomena. 
The so-called financial physicists are trying to reach new levels 
of sophistications. Lo and Mueller (2010) argue that the parallels 
between physics and finance are closer due to the fact that the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing formula is also the solution to the heat 
equation. Interestingly, the authors also remind us the following:
14
“Among the multitude of advantages that physicists have 
over financial economists is one that is rarely noted: the 
practice of physics is largely left to physicists. When physics 
experiences a crisis, physicists are generally allowed to sort 
through the issues by themselves, without the distraction of 
outside interference. When a financial crisis occurs, it seems 
that everyone becomes a financial expert overnight, with 
surprisingly strong opinions on what caused the crisis and 
how to fix it. ….. Imagine how much more challenging it would 
have been to fix the Large Hadron Collider after its September 
19, 2008 short circuit if, after its breakdown, Congress held 
hearings in which various constituents - including religious 
leaders, residents of neighboring towns, and unions involved 
in the accelerator’s construction - were asked to testify about 
what went wrong and how best to deal with its failure. Imagine 
further that after several months of such hearings, politicians 
- few of whom are physicists - start to draft legislation to 
change the way particle accelerators are to be built, managed, 
and staffed, and compensation limits are imposed on the 
most senior research scientists associated with the facility.”
Finally, I should mention that developments in the information 
technology sector have benefitted the finance industry enormously. 
Financial institutions are now providing improved services to their 
clients. The growth of high speed computerized trading has provided 
new opportunities to capital market investors / high-frequency traders 
as they can trade very quickly at lower costs. Computer generated 
trading strategies (algorithmic trading) are used to benefit from 
wrong pricing of financial instruments. While these developments 
are applauded, new risk of market destabilization has also arisen. 
An example is trading in which unusually large numbers of orders 
to buy or sell stocks are placed in a second, only to be cancelled 
within another second, a phenomenon called “quote stuffing”. In 
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the US, there is allegation that orders taking place with the click of 
a computer mouse might have created “flash crash” of May 6, 2010 
when the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged by 700 points in a 
few minutes. Research on this kind of phenomenon to know the origin 
of an event has given birth to a new expression called forensic finance 
– the term introduced by Stephen Ross (in Risk Magazine, 1999) 
and formalized by Ritter (2008) following the approach adopted by 
typical forensic investigators using information from DNA, teeth, etc.
As I mentioned earlier, it is not my intention to describe each link. The 
list of disciplines presented in Figure 2 is by no means exhaustive. 
One can show links with some other subjects too. A recent study 
shows that biology (genes and testosterone) can affect risk-sensitive 
financial decisions (Sapienza, Zingales and Maestripieri, 2009). Who 
knows one day someone will come up with an insight from Geology 
that can be applied to predict financial earthquakes? But, the message 
is that the field of corporate finance is extremely versatile; it has no 
precise boundary; it enormously benefits from diversity coming from 
its relationship with other disciplines. All in all, the subject of corporate 
finance is technologically so advanced that we can be very proud of 
it. But, it does not mean that we can blindly use any model to predict 
the future. In fact, there is a great danger of finance being influenced 
too much by other disciplines when some people, especially those 
who do not practice finance, starts stretching it towards rocket 
science. One can not rule away that an overemphasis on falsified 
financial technology, where computers got more dominance than 
people, techniques got more attention than substance, worked out as 
a disaster and intensified the current financial crisis. This is a lesson 
to be remembered for the future. The international weekly magazine 
The Economist (July 8, 2009) points out this lesson as follows:
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“No economic theory suggests you should value mortgage 
derivatives on the basis that house prices would always rise. 
Finance professors are not to blame for this, but they might have 
shouted more loudly that their insights were being misused.”
I would like to use the remaining time of this lecture to illustrate a few 
of my research projects.
fINANCING wITh dEbT oR EqUITy
Companies can raise short-term and long-term funds in two ways: 
internally by retaining earnings and externally from the capital market. 
The two principal external sources are equity and debt. These come 
from either private sources like private placements and bank loans, 
or public sources like issuing new securities in domestic and foreign 
capital markets. In addition to these formal sources of finance, there 
exist other financing channels like angel financing (from high net-
worth individuals) and trade credit (from suppliers or customers), and 
for many emerging countries, informal sources (e.g. moneylenders, 
cooperatives, informal banks).5
An important corporate finance issue is whether a private company 
should become public by seeking a listing on a stock exchange. The 
combined stock markets in the USA have a total market capitalization 
of about $15 trillion. These are also the world’s most active markets. 
Tokyo and London stock exchanges have market capitalization of 
$3.3 trillion and $2.8 trillion, respectively. Among the emerging 
countries, China and India play a big role. The number of domestic 
companies listed on Indian exchanges is the largest in the world. 
In the ten years between 1995 and 2005, stock markets in East 
5 See Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2010) who examine financing patterns of Chinese firms.
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Asia witnessed thousands of new listings of domestic companies. 
The number appearing on China’s stock exchanges grew from 
320 to 1390. On the other hand, many companies are also leaving 
stock exchanges in recent months. This is particularly happening 
for firms from developed countries whose plans were thwarted by 
various uncertainties including the lack of enthusiasm of investors.
The sale of shares by a company to the investing public for the first 
time is commonly known as initial public offering (IPO). There are good 
reasons for firms to remain private: managers of private firms have 
freedom to take decisions they like without any external interference; 
they also possess greater control of firms’ resources. But, a few other 
reasons like the constant pressure from owners and banks, the need 
to raise additional capital by means of subsequent offerings, the 
desire to grow further and increase visibility necessitate firms to go 
public. A recent study (Chemmanpur, He and Nandy, 2009) finds that 
Figure 3: World stock markets in 2009. Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
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firms that are larger in size, have higher sales growth, greater market 
share, operating in more capital-intensive industries, and in industries 
characterized by riskier cash flows, are more likely to go public.
Interest for companies to go public has temporarily declined in recent 
years: from about 1800 worldwide IPOs in 2007 to about less than 
600 in 2009. You may remember one of the largest IPO made by the 
Agricultural Bank of China – the country’s third-largest bank – which 
took place on early July, 2010. The bank hoped to raise about €15 billion. 
Another example is the planned re-listing of General Motors – the US car 
manufacturer that triggered the largest industrial bankruptcy in 2009. 
IPOs are also used by small companies. For example, the microlending 
company from Mexico – Compartamos Bank – went public in 2007; 
India’s largest microlending company SKS Microfinance in this year.
Once listed, financing opportunities of companies increase. Theyare 
no more exclusively dependent on bank loans. Due to the credit crisis, 
Figure 4: Number of new listings and delistings of domestic companies in 2009. Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
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many companies are opting to issue new equity. Since 2009, about 
30 listed Dutch firms raised new equity capital. The last week of 
September 2010 witnessed the world’s biggest ever equity offering of 
$70 billion by Brazil’s oil company Petrobas. 
Question like how much debt is optimal (providing highest value) for a 
company has been keeping corporate finance lively for several decades. 
The split between debt and equity is popularly known as capital structure. 
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller were the first to show that, under 
certain assumptions (no imperfections like taxes, distress, etc.), the 
amount of debt held by a company makes no difference to its total 
value. The intuition is that the value of a firm is derived on the basis of 
its quality of assets in generating future cash flows, not on its financing. 
This intuition has become a foundation stone of corporate finance. The 
funny thing about their proposition is that it is only true in circumstances 
that are rare in practice. Companies do try not to incur too much debt.
Figure 5 shows that 9% of corporate funding in the UK in 2007 
was raised through the bond market while 32% was in the firm of 
loans. The trend is similar in continental Europe, with just 3% of 
German companies’ liability in the form of bonds but 39% in loans. 
In the USA, by contrast, only a quarter of companies’ debt was in 
the form of bank loans, with 14% of their funding raised via bonds. 
Bank lending declined substantially during the financial crisis. 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) report that total bank loans in the 
USA fell from $701 billion in the second quarter of 2007 (the peak 
of the credit boom) to $150 billion in the last quarter of 2008. The 
credit crisis has triggered the alarm that smaller companies, highly 
dependent on bank lending, struggled to receive financing from banks 
and to refinance their existing debts. Global bond issuance from non-
financial companies has now surpassed corporate loans. Non-financial 
companies have issued $1.1 trillion worth of bonds during Jan-Aug 
2009. It exceeded the annual record of $898 billion set in 2007.
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In a joint study with Abe de Jong and Thuy Thu Nguen, I investigate 
the financing mix of a sample of about 12.000 non-financial listed firms 
from 42 industrialized and emerging countries. One must recognize 
that many complications arise in cross-country measurement / 
comparison of the amounts of debt and equity. It is possible to 
measure these in book values (using the par or face value) or in market 
values; one can differentiate short-term from long-term borrowing; 
accounting conventions can distort the true picture; certain types of 
liabilities (for example, lease obligations, off-balance sheet liabilities) 
are not reported in a transparent manner. Figure 6 depicts the 
median long-term debt ratio estimated in market values for a few 
countries. It shows that these ratios are not that high. The finding is 
consistent with some other studies which show that leverage ratios 
of corporations in many industrialized countries have been declining. 
Listed firms have usually little debt compared to private firms.
Figure 5: The financing mix of companies.
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Decisions on how much to finance a company by debt is usually 
explained with the help of a few theories. The trade-off theory indicates 
that firms choose a certain capital structure by weighing the benefits 
(tax deductibility of interest payments, reduction of free cash flows, etc.) 
and costs (financial distress, agency conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders, etc.) of additional debt. Firms set a target ratio and move 
towards it by trading-off the costs against the benefits. The asymmetric 
information or pecking order theory indicates that because of the costs 
of issuing new securities (managers use their private information to 
value these securities), firms prefer to use retained earnings first. 
But, when retained earnings are not enough, firms issue debt first 
because it has a less adverse effect. Equity is issued as a last resort.
Our study (de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008) shows that a firm’s 
capital structure is influenced by firm-specific factors like firm size, 
asset tangibility, profitability, firm risk and growth opportunities. We 
find that the impact of some firm factors on debt use is strong in many 
countries. If a firm has a high fraction of tangible assets, then these 
Figure 6: Long-term debt ratio of non-financial firms from selected countries.
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assets can be used as collateral, mitigating the risk of the lender. Hence, 
firms with a large amount of tangible assets have high leverage. Larger 
firms use higher levels of leverage as these firms are usually more 
diversified and have more stable cash flows. We observe a negative 
relation between profitability and corporate leverage; it suggests that 
firms prefer to use retained earnings for new investments. Growth 
opportunities of firms show a negative relationship with debt-ratios. The 
finding is consistent with the conjecture that firms with more growth 
opportunities in the future prefer to keep leverage low so that they do 
not give up profitable investments. However, we also find that in each 
country one or more firm-specific factors are not really important in 
determining debt ratios (See Teble 1). Statistical test indicates that the 
implicit assumption of equal firm-level determinants of leverage across 
countries made earlier by some other researchers, does not hold.
Our study documents that debt-ratios are not only affected by firm-
factors but also by country-specific factors like investor rights 
protection, market/bank based financial system, stock/bond market 
development and growth rate of a country’s gross domestic product 
Figure 7: Factors affecting financing mix choice.
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(see Figure 7). In the analysis of the direct impact of country-specific 
factors, we observe that certain factors like GDP growth rate, bond 
market development and creditor right protection significantly explain 
the variation in capital structure across countries. Moreover, we find 
considerable explanatory power of country-specific variables beyond 
firm-specific factors. Another interesting finding is that country-
specific variables influence firms’ financing mix indirectly. For example, 
we observe that in countries with a better law enforcement system 
and a more healthy economy, firms are not only likely to take more 
debt, but the effects of some firm-level determinants of leverage such 
as growth opportunity, profitability and liquidity are also reinforced. 
The recommendation we provide in this analysis is that country-
specific factors do matter in determining and affecting the leverage 
choice around the world, and it is useful to take into account these 
factors appropriately in the analysis of capital structure of firms.
	 Expected	 Positve	 Negative
	 relationship	 relationship	 relationship
Firm size +	 21	 1
Asset tangibility +	 32
Profitability -	 	 25
Growth -	 	 24
opportunity
Risk -	 	 13
Liquidity -	 1	 12
Tax +	 2	 8
Table 1: Number od countries showing statistically significant relationships between firm-specific factors and debt ratio.
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In addition to examining the factors influencing the debt-ratio of 
companies, an interesting avenue of research has been to examine 
the announcement effect of financing decisions.6 In a joint study 
with Peter Roosenboom on new equity issues by Dutch firms, we 
document that share prices decline significantly (see Figure 8). The 
most widely accepted explanation of this finding is that new equity 
issues convey pessimistic information about the value of the issuing 
firm. We also find that larger issues are associated with a larger 
decline in stock price. Since new issues are sold at a discount, we also 
examine the impact of these discounts. Unsurprisingly, we find that 
stock issues with higher discounts experience a more negative price 
decline. We also investigate the long-term operating performance of 
firms subsequent to equity issues. Measures like returns on assets 
and return on sales systematically show an abnormal decline in 
performance. We undertake some further investigations and find 
these results to be consistent with the conjectures that (a) corporate 
managers possess private information and decide to issue new equity 
when the prevailing market price is larger than their intrinsic value; 
and (b) equity financing leads shareholders to incur increased agency 
costs as the probability of managerial overinvestment increases. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that earnings management activities 
(both accrual-based as well as real) can also be an explanation of 
the post-equity issue underperformance of firms. Although these 
are considered as plausible views, a recent study by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) claims that the primary reason that a firm 
issues new equity is to satisfy its shortage of cash. They observe 
that without equity offerings, about 63% of issuers would have run 
out of cash and be forced to change their operating and/or financing 
decisions, and 81% of would have had subnormal cash balances.
6 A recent example is the announcement made on September 28, 2010 by the French tire manufacturer Michelin 
to raise €1.2 billion of new equity to finance its expansion into fast-growing emerging markets. The issue price  
of these new shares represents a 31% discount to the closing share price of a day earlier. 
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CoRPoRATE REsTRUCTURING
Companies undertake a variety of activities related to expansion or 
downsizing. Mergers and acquisitions, diversification, restructurings 
like asset sales, spin-offs, are popular examples. After the lacklustre 
period associated with the financial crisis, many observers are 
expecting mergers and acquisitions to come back. Earlier studies have 
found that M&A takes place in waves coinciding with business cycles. 
Companies that are hoarding cash may use these for M&A purposes. 
Popular corporations like Google and Oracle are reported to have 
more than $22 billion of cash / liquid assets. During the six months 
to the end of June 2010, M&A deals with a value of about $1.2 trillion 
remain well below the peak of $2.6 trillion reached during the first 
half of 2007. You may remember the recent deals in the Netherlands 
like Spyker-Saab, Canon-Océ. Recently on Aug 19, 2010, we have 
seen the $7.7 billion offer from the computer chip manufacturer Intel 
to buy McAfee – the popular antivirus-software firm – at a price of 
Figure 8: Stock returns around the announcement of equity issues.
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$48 per share which is 60% higher than the previous day’s closing 
price. This is even small compared to the hostile bid of almost $39 
billion from the mining giant BHP Billiton for another mining/ fertilizer 
company: PotashCorp. Deals targeting emerging markets have been 
growing steadily throughout the last several years. Asian companies 
are also expected to become more active in Europe and the USA.
A popular form of corporate restructuring is that of increasing or 
decreasing firm’s diversification to different areas of businesses. 
Such activities generate both benefits and costs. Diversified firms 
can have more access to internally generated resources, can create 
and exploit market power advantages, and can have the ability to 
exploit excess resources. On the other hand, diversified firms are 
prone to severe agency and incentive problems that can lead to 
inefficient resource allocation. Interesting questions like why firms 
diversify and what are the effects of corporate diversification on firm 
performance are routinely being examined in the academic literature.
A few years ago, while I was at Tilburg University, I started to work on 
Indian business groups with Sytse Douma and Rejie George. Business 
group is a network whereby several firms are informally bound together 
through ownership, control and social relationships. These groups 
are present in many developed as well as emerging economies, and 
encompass independent companies including both stock exchange 
listed as well as unlisted firms. Japanese groups called Keiretsu and 
Korean groups called Chaebol are long-standing examples. Many of 
you may have heard of Indian group called Tata which has about 140 
years of history and makes everything from tea, salt to buses and cars. 
In examining corporate diversification by business group firms in India, 
hypotheses are developed using a multi-theoretic perspective that we 
introduced earlier in another paper (Douma, George and Kabir, 2006) 
and which is presented in Figure 9. A unitary perspective is inadequate 
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for emerging economy firms because it provides a partial view only. By 
incorporating elements of the agency, resource-based and institutional 
theories, we provide a more holistic perspective that helps to identify 
the differing influences of various categories of shareholders among 
Indian firms. This is important because the theoretical postulates 
concerning the relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and 
its performance were developed and empirically tested primarily in 
developed capital markets.
While considering the nature of business groups, we observe that 
diversification can take place at both firm and group levels. At the 
firm level, existing firms diversify into new lines of business, while at 
the group level new firms are established to pursue additional lines of 
business. Two relevant questions are: why do group affiliated firms 
Figure 9: Multi-theoretic approach in explaining ownership-performance relationshsip among firms in an emerging  
 economy context.
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diversify at all when the expected benefits of diversification can be 
achieved at the group level? How business group features influence 
the corporate diversification – firm performance relationship? In a study 
together with Rejie George, I investigate these questions. We consider 
the fact that firms affiliated to business groups undertake diversifying 
operations to share some of the common benefits and costs. For 
example, member firms tap the group’s capital and managerial resources 
and utilize these efficiently for additional diversification activities; 
they can benefit from inter-firm cooperation in the form of access to 
complementary resources and various internal business transactions. 
On the other hand, business groups can have other objectives that 
are not necessarily in congruence with the objectives of each member 
firm. For example, inefficient resource allocation or expropriation of the 
wealth of minority shareholders can occur among group affiliated firms. 
We use the framework presented in Figure 10 to conduct our analysis.
Figure 10: The intermediating effect of business group on the diversification and performance relationship.
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Group-affiliation can complement firm level diversification by moving/
sharing resources within the member firms of the group. Larger and 
more diversified business groups are able to provide privileged access 
to resources to member firms in facilitating their diversification pursuits. 
Larger business groups can also internalize the costs associated with 
group structures more efficiently. Greater group level diversification 
can develop dynamic capabilities associated with obtaining requisite 
licenses, technical knowhow, and setting up distribution networks. 
Major types of owners like institutions, corporations and directors can 
have conflicting incentives for their firms to engage in either more or 
less diversification.
Our findings reveal that, at first sight, diversification strategies of firms in 
India lower firm performance. However, when we turn our attention to 
firms’ affiliation with business groups, some interesting results emerge. 
We find that Indian firms affiliated to business groups are significantly 
more diversified than independent firms. Within the group-affiliated 
firms we document a differential impact of corporate diversification. 
In particular, we observe that firms affiliated to large business groups 
mitigate the underperformance from corporate diversification. On the 
other hand, we find that business group diversity has no significant 
moderating effect. Overall, the findings support the conjecture that 
firms affiliated to larger business groups are able to utilize certain 
resources so as to generate better performance out of their individual 
diversification strategies. With regard to domestic corporate and 
director ownerships, we detect a differential impact based on whether 
these ownerships are linked with affiliated or unaffiliated firms.
CoRPoRATE GovERNANCE
Corporate governance has become a truly interdisciplinary area with 
work being undertaken by researchers from finance, accounting, 
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management, economics and law (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). 
Research covering various issues related to company shareholders, 
managers, and executive pay has mostly been dominant. On diverse 
issues surrounding these areas, I had the privilege to work with quite 
a large number of colleagues. Considering the limited amount of time 
available today, I shall focus on executive pay related research that 
I have been doing recently. This is also an area that triggers a lot of 
interest from the general public, regulators, journalists and academics. 
Who won’t after hearing that in 2008 the top executives in the USA 
earned 300 times more than average workers? Although this differential 
is much less in Europe, stunning headlines like the following frequently 
appear on the media: executive’s salary has ballooned; chief executive’s 
pay has sky rocketed; fat cat remuneration makes managers super rich. 
Unlike top managers of industrial firms, the fact that football, golf or 
tennis players earn millions of dollars is perceived to be the result of hard 
work. In any case, pay is a topic, which we all like to discuss whenever 
it concerns others, but prefer to avoid when it deals with ourselves.
Providing corporate managers with performance-based pay like bonus, 
stocks, options can increase their motivation and thus contribute to 
an increase in firm performance. Pay is also a mechanism to attract 
and retain the best qualified people, and establish a long-term binding 
relationship with the firm. On the other hand, many believe that high 
level of pay is an outcome of managerial power and it helps executives 
to extort personal gains at the expense of other stakeholders. In a 
joint study with Piet Duffhues, I analyze the remuneration data of top 
management team of a sample of Dutch non-financial listed firms. 
Although we could not obtain all the data that we wished to collect, we 
undertook a detailed statistical analysis that accounted for company 
size, leverage, industry affiliation, etc. Yet we were unable to find 
any systematic evidence of a positive pay-performance relationship 
(see Duffhues and Kabir, 2008). It seems an analysis over the longer 
run, as done by Frydman and Saks (2010), may help to improve our 
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understanding of executive pay practices. At the same time, O’Reilly 
and Main (2010) show that executive pay setting process can also be 
explained by social psychological mechanisms like norms of reciprocity 
and social influence of board of directors.
Many people believe that top managers receive high pay because of 
the action or inaction of various entities. A group that received criticism 
is the one of pay consultants who advises firms on the appropriate 
amount and structure of executive pay packages. As professional 
experts, consultants help firms to optimally design top executives’ pay 
by offering a valuable service. On the other hand, critics argue that 
they do not act independently because they have strong incentives 
to advocate generous pay in order to enhance their chance of being 
re-employed in the future by the client firm for both pay and non-pay 
related services. Recent studies document that chief executive officers 
(CEOs) of firms that use compensation consultants receive higher pay 
relative to those who do not employ any consultant (Cadman, Carter 
and Hillegeist, 2010; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009). In a joint study 
with Marizah Minhat, I find that many UK firms seek recommendations 
from not just one but several compensation consultants. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these consultants (see Figure 11) do not come 
cheap (they charge about £500 - £800 an hour for their services). 
Murphy and Sandino (2010) observe that the average pay consulting 
fee paid in 2006 for a sample of Canadian companies was almost US$ 
90,000. If a consultant does not come cheap, then it poses the question: 
why firms use these costly multiple compensation consultants? 
It has been argued that firms use diverse pay consultants because they 
want to obtain independent recommendations from each of them. This 
practice is also essential in order to design an optimal pay package 
as different consultants specialize in different aspects of pay. Will 
the use of multiple consultants lead to a lowering of executive pay? 
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Not necessarily. Firms can create an impression that the decision on 
pay has been made by seeking advice from different consultants.
In our study (Kabir and Minhat, 2010), we present some remarkable 
findings. We observe that equity-based pay of CEOs increases 
significantly when firms rely on a higher number of compensation 
consultants. It can suggest that different consultants indeed 
specialize in different aspects of pay. Interestingly, our analysis 
also shows that while an increase in the number of compensation 
consultants is associated with an increase in CEO compensation, 
there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when firms 
reduce the number of pay consultants. The evidence lends support 
to the conjecture that firms employ multiple pay consultants to 
provide a justification of increased level of executive compensation.
Figure 11: Number of pay consultants used by UK firms (2003-2006).
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It is almost impossible for consultants to advise openly and critically on 
pay. We argue that pay consultants usually advise in favour of higher 
pay in order to maintain their business interests with client firms and 
survive from competition for both pay and non-pay related businesses 
(for example, providing consultancy on human resource management, 
internal control, insurance, financial and risk management). They want 
to ensure the continuity of their business. The prospect of lucrative 
business interests incentivize them to compete intensely with each other. 
We examine this issue and find support for it because the market share 
of compensation consultants is positively related to CEO pay. This is 
particularly true for consultants with the two largest market shares in the 
UK (i.e. New Bridge Street and Towers Perrin). The finding is consistent 
with the argument that by advising towards higher pay, compensation 
consultants tend to survive competition from other consultants.
Most studies on executive pay analyze issues from the viewpoint of firms’ 
shareholders. An interesting question is: how firms’ other investors 
react to executive pay awards? Aren’t creditors also concerned with 
soaring pay levels? Managers are often compensated with substantial 
stock option grants so that they are not reluctant to accept value 
increasing but risky investment projects. In this way, shareholders can 
benefit from future stock price increases. But, when the additional 
risky investments increase the firm’s default probability, creditors will 
undoubtedly suffer. It is therefore quite reasonable to believe that 
creditors will not allow an increase in the default risk to go unmarked. 
They are smart enough to anticipate increased risk-taking tendency of 
managers arising out of incentive pay. Therefore, creditors are expected 
to charge a higher borrowing rate to compensate for any future loss.
In order to examine this premise, Hao Li, Yulia Veld-Merkoulova and 
I undertake a study to examine a sample of UK firms. An appealing 
feature of the study is that we focus not only on cash-based incentive 
(bonus) and equity-based incentives (stock and option grants), but 
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also on defined benefit pensions - a liability of the firm that can be 
viewed as debt-based pay. Pensions belong to the important category 
of executive compensation that has not yet been investigated 
thoroughly. These have the potential to closely align the interests of 
the managers with those of the creditors (i.e. keeping the firm solvent).
Our empirical results show that firms awarding their CEOs with higher 
proportions of defined benefit pensions experience a significant 
reduction in the cost of debt. On the other hand, companies with high 
level of stock options granted to the CEOs are severely punished by 
the capital market: these firms face a higher borrowing cost. Another 
remarkable contribution from our study comes from splitting stock 
option compensation into two categories: performance-vested stock 
options that may further motivate managers to take extra risk to 
meet these targets, and traditional stock options that do not have any 
targets attached. We observe that investors react to performance-
vested stock options and traditional stock options differently: firms 
with relatively more performance-vested stock options holdings face 
a higher cost of borrowing. The general conclusion from this study 
is that creditors of firms are fully aware of both risk-taking and risk-
avoiding incentives created by various executive pay components. 
Therefore, while making decisions on executive pay packages, board of 
directors should also consider its impact on the cost of debt financing.
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